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STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN JURY DISCRIMINATION CASES
JOHN S. DE CANI*
THE BACKGROUND
In a series of decisions beginning in 1880 with
Strauder v. West Virginia,1 the United States Su-
preme Court has gradually refined the definition of
what constitutes jury discrimination. Justice Doug-
las, in his concurring opinion in Alexander v.
Louisiana,2 wrote that the accused has a "consti-
tutional right to an impartial jury drawn from a
group representative of a cross-section of the com-
munity." 3 This seems to be the operant definition
of due process as it applies to the selection of juries
today.
In order to show that he has been denied due
process because of jury discrimination, a petitioner
must show two things: first, that his jury was not
"drawn from a group representative of a cross-sec-
tion of the community," and second, that "the
opportunity for discrimination was present." 4 In
fact, the definition of "representative cross-sec-
tion" seems to depend on the class of the petitioner.
Alexander v. Louisiana5 is instructive. Claude
Alexander, a Negro, appealed his conviction for
rape on three grounds:
(1) He was indicted by a grand jury chosen
from a venire from which Negro citizens were sys-
tematically excluded.
(2) He was indicted by a grand jury chosen from
a venire from which women were systematically
excluded.
(3) A statement was introduced at his trial
which he had allegedly given to the police shortly
after his arrest, at a time when he had neither
waived his right to remain silent, nor his right to
have counsel present at the time he gave the state-
ment.
6
In its opinion, the Court ignored the third
ground and reversed the decision of the lower court
* Chairman of the Statistics and Operations Re-
search Department, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2405 U.S. 625, 634 (1971) (Douglas, J, concurring).
3Id. at 635.
4 See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
1405 U.S. 625.
6 Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1971).
on the basis of the first. With respect to the second
point, the Court said:
This claim is novel in this Court and, when urged
by a male, finds no support in our past cases....
[T]here is nothing m past adjudications suggesting
that petititoner himself has been denied equal pro-
tection by the alleged exclusion of women from
grand jury service.... Against this background
and because petitioner's conviction has been set
aside on other grounds, we follow our usual cus-
tom of avoiding decision of constitutional issues
unnecessary to the decision of the case before usY
This seems to mean that a defendant has cause
to complain only if the group from which his jury
was chosen was unrepresentative with respect to
his own class. Once the petitioner has shown that
the group from which his jury was chosen was not
representative of his class, and that the opportunity
for discrimination was present, he is said to have
made a "primafacie case." Such a case having been
made, the burden shifts to the state to rebut it.8
The statistician's task is to assist in making the
prima facie case. A statistician might also be called
upon to rebut such a case, but, as far as I know,
this has not yet happened.
It is only recently that the Court has begun to
accept sophisticated statistical arguments based
on probability theory in these cases. The first such
case was Whitus v. Georgia,9 but note the judicial
caution. The relevant footnote begins, "While un-
necessary to our disposition of the instant case, it
is interesting to note the 'probability' involved in
the situation before the Court." 10 Four years later,
the caution was still present, reflected in a footnote
in Alexander: "We take note, as we did in Whitus
v. Georgia ... of petitioner's demonstration .... )) "
Here, the word "probability" is no longer enclosed
in quotes, and the word "chances" is used, again
without quotes, as a synonym for probability. The
, 405 U.S. at 633.
8 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970).
See also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935).
9 385 U.S. 545 (1967).10 Id. at 552 n.2.
11405 U.S. at 630 n.9.
34
Vol. 65, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.
JURY DISCRIMINATION
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was more explicit.
In Salary v. Wilson, 12 in a dosing footnote, the
court said: "Such probability calculations are ad-
missible in a jury discrimination case if proffered
by a qualified witness with underlying data prop-
erly proved." 13
Apparently, the Court was persuaded to accept
probabilistic arguments by a paper by Michael
Finkelstein which appeared in the Harvard Law
Review in 1966.11 In this paper, Finkelstein traces
the history of judicial reasoning in discrimination
cases, and shows that the Court has been intui-
tively reasoning probabilistically for some time.
He argues that statistical decisions have a well es-
tablished theoretical basis which should replace
intuition in judicial reasoning. He illustrates his
point by applying statistical reasoning to the facts
in several jury discrimination cases. The Court
cited Finkelstein in its Whitus decision, 5 and this
paper has had a major influence on legal arguments
in jury discrimination cases ever since.
DIscOvERrNG = FAcrs
In order to make a prima fade case that he has
been denied due process, the plaintiff must first
show that his jury was not drawn from a group
representative of a cross-section of the community,
and then show that the opportunity for discrimina-
tion was present. The latter demonstration has
usually been based on the source of the jury list,
such as tax rolls, voter registration lists, city di-
rectories or telephone directories. One could argue
statistically that these sources are themselves non-
representative, but the more common argument is
that the sources supply some racial designation.
That this is so is an ascertainable fact, and does not
require a probabilistic argument.
Since the decision in Whitus, the Supreme Court
has shown a willingness to listen to a probabilistic
argument that the group from which the jury was
chosen was not a representative cross-section of the
community. In order to understand the argument,
one must have a rough idea of how juries are se-
lected. Practice varies from place to place, as does
the terminology, but what follows is typical of
many jurisdictions.
The boundaries of the geographical area from
12415 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969).
'
3 Id. at 473 n.11.
14Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision
Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 H. v. L.
REv. 338 (1966).15385 U.S. at 552 n.2.
which jurors are drawn depends upon the jurisdic-
tion of the court. Frequently, this jurisdiction en-
compasses a county. The qualifications for jury
service are set by statute. Until recently, for exam-
ple, a juror had to be twenty-one years of age or
older, and of "good character." In some areas,
women may serve only if they volunteer. Convicted
felons, and persons under indictment for a felony,
may not serve. In each jurisdiction, a Jury Com-
mission is appointed whose task it is to prepare a
list of persons eligible for jury service for each term
of court, and to keep that list up to date. This list
is called the "jury roll." When a jury is required, a
list of names is selected from the jury roll, and the
persons on the list are notified to appear in court
on a given day for possible jury service. The list of
persons called to appear is called a "venire." The
actual jury is chosen from the venire.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion in Alexander, indi-
cates that the jury must be chosen from a group
representative of a cross-section of the community.
He does not say that the jury itself must be repre-
sentative. The plaintiff cannot attack his own jury
as being nonrepresentative of his class. He can,
however, show that his class has been persistently
excluded or under-represented on juries in the
past. 6 Ordinarily, the plaintiff tries to show that
the jury roll is nonrepresentative. He may also
show that the venire from which his jury was
chosen, and a sequence of venires preceding his
own, were nonrepresentative.
In order to show that a jury roll is not a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community, there
must be available a description of the community.
"Community" here means the population of the
jurisdiction eligible for jury service. Ideally, one
will have a statistical description of this population
as of some time immediately preceding the plain-
tiff's trial, perhaps, as of the beginning of that
particular term of court, or as of the time of the
crime. This description should give the total num-
ber of persons eligible and the number of eligibles
in the plaintiff's class. Obviously, such a descrip-
tion is seldom available.
The Court has accepted other statistical descrip-
tions of the community, most frequently the most
recent census of population for the jurisdiction.
The census, taken every ten years, is subject to
error, and is obsolete within three or four years.
Yet, it is a publication of the Government, which
seems to give it a certain credibility in the eyes of
16See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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the Court. To the statistician, the census has ad-
vantages because it classifies the population as to
age, race and sex. Sometimes, equally acceptable
and more recent descriptions are available. In
Salary, there was available a census taken by
the Birmingham, Alabama Health Department
in 1967, which classified residents of Bessemer by
age, race and sex. These data were acceptable to
the court. In many jurisdictions, the voter regis-
tration list provides an acceptable listing of the
eligible population. Once such a list is in hand,
however, the race and sex of the persons on it must
be ascertained. The voting age is usually coincident
with the age for jury service. For most persons on
the list, sex may be judged by the name and, fre-
quently, race may be judged by address. A com-
plete breakdown of the voter registration list re-
quires some field work, and most plaintiffs do not
have the necessary resources available. Further-
more, the court must be willing to accept the re-
liability of the procedures used.
In cases where voter registration lists have been
used, the necessary field work has been done by
volunteers. Where possible, race and sex have been
determined by name and address. In small rural
counties, many persons on the voter registration
list are known to the volunteers. Cases of doubt
must be resolved by face-to-face interviews. Even
here, complete classification of the voter registra-
tion list is time consuming and subject to some
errors. In large jurisdictions, such a task is im-
possible. Yet, with new and more stringent voter
registration laws, the voter registration list comes
closest to being the most recent and most nearly
complete listing of the group of eligible jurors.
With modem sampling techniques, it is possible to
obtain very reliable estimates of the characteristics
of persons on these lists using relatively small sam-
ples. The sampling could easily be supervised by a
professional and carried out by a small group of
trained volunteers. That this is seldom done seems
to be because courts and attorneys have more faith
in bad censuses than in good samples.
As a last resort, one can always fall back on the
United States Census for a description of the com-
munity that is acceptable to the Court. There is
no such "out" for obtaining a description of the
characteristics of the jury roll. In some cases, as
in Alexander, the questionndires sent to prospective
jurors contain questions pertaining to age, race and
sex. In others, the original source of the jury roll,
such as the tax roll or the city directory contains
the necessary information. Frequently, the only
way to obtain the information is through local in-
formants or face-to-face interviews. As with the
voter registration list, reliable estimates of the
characteristics of the jury roll can be obtained
using modem sampling techniques. Sampling has
been used in some cases, but it has been of a very
simple nature. Thus, a 20 per cent sample of the
jury roll might be taken by choosing one of the
first five names on the list "at random," and every
fifth name thereafter. Courts have accepted such
procedures, probably without realizing that their
technical analysis can be very complicated. The
effect of selecting every fifth name on a list is not
the same as selecting 20 per cent of the names at
random.
Relying on local informants can sometimes lead
to difficulty. After the Court rejected petitioner's
claim of jury discrimination in Swain v. Alabama,"
Swain's attorneys sought to reopen the case using
a more sophisticated statistical argument. The 1960
U.S. Census of Talladega County, Alabama pro-
vided a description of the characteristics of the
community, and a comparison was made between
the racial characteristics of the community, as
shown by the Census, and the racial characteristics
of a sequence of venires, including the one from
which Swain's original jury was chosen. Local
volunteers were used to determine the race of the
veniremen, and, in some cases, race was ascertained
by inquires in the neighborhood. At the hearing,
the county prosecutor objected to the statistical
evidence on the grounds that it was hearsay. His
objection was sustained and the statistical argu-
ment was not heard. Swain was my first case, and
I found it frustrating not to be able to testify once
I had taken the stand. More important, however,
is that we learned something about what consti-
tutes acceptable statistical evidence. The underly-
ing data must be "properly proved." Witnesses
must be able to testify from first-hand knowledge
when data do not come from a source such as public
records, which courts will accept. This is a strong
argument for sampling when the plaintiff must
obtain the data himself.
MAKING Tm DEMONSTRATION
Given that there exists data, properly provable,
on the characteristics of the community and the
characteristics of the group from which the plain-
tiff's jury was chosen, one must next consider the
question of whether the group is a "representative
17 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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cross-section" of the community. Immediately, one
is confronted by a minor difficulty. A jury roll
would be nonrepresentative if the plaintiff's class
were either substantially under-represented or sub-
stantially over-represented on it. Yet, it is doubtful
that any court would support a claim that the
plaintiff had been denied due process because his
class was substantially over-represented on the
jury roll. What must be shown, in fact, is that the
plaintiff's class was substantially under-repre-
sented.
In statistical parlance, one is concerned with a
"one tail" test. The logic of such a test is best ex-
plained by a hypothetical example. Suppose that
the "community" contained 50 per cent black and
50 per cent white members, and the jury roll con-
tained 100 names. For simplicity, assume that the
community is "very large", so that drawing any
100 persons from it will not substantially alter its
racial composition. Under the law, the method
of selecting names for the roll must be independent
of race. If this is so, then blacks and whites have
the same probability of selection, and one would
expect about one-half the names to be those of
black persons. While the most probable composi-
tion of the jury roll is fifty-fifty, one would not
suspect the selection procedure if it produced the
names of forty-five blacks and fifty-five whites.
One becomes suspicious only when the result seems
"very unlikely" to have been produced by a selec-
tion procedure that is racially blind. Probability
theory provides an objective measure of how sus-
picious one ought to be. Without additional as-
sumptions, which would be difficult to defend, one
cannot compute the likelihood, or probability,
given the result, that an unbiased selection pro-
cedure was used. One can, however, compute the
probability of obtaining any result, given that the
selection procedure was unbiased. (Note that these
two probabilities are different. The probability that
a card is an ace given that it is a heart is quite
different from the probability that it is a heart
given that it is an ace.)
Suppose the roll contains the names of thirty-
eight blacks and sixty-two whites. If one suspects
the selection procedure when thirty-eight blacks
appear on the roll, then he ought to suspect it even
more if fewer than thirty-eight blacks appear on the
roll. If the method of selection is independent of
race, the probability of obtaining the names of
thirty-eight or fewer blacks on a roll of 100 names
is approximately 0.01, i.e., the chances are about
one out of 100. If one regards one chance in a
hundred as extremely unlikely, then there is reason
to be suspicious of the selection procedure. In most
routine statistical work, one chance in twenty
(0.05) is regarded as small enough to warrant the
judgement that factors other than chance were
operating to produce an observed difference.-
Most statisticans would urge courts to decide in
advance of seeing the evidence how small the prob-
ability must be in order to make a primafacie case.
Most courts would probably regard such advice as
heresy. Yet, courts draw lines all the time, and
drawing this line would remove one element of
arbitrariness from the decision. In doing so, how-
ever, courts should be aware of the hazards in-
volved. Suppose the court draws the line at one
chance in one hundred, maintaining that a proba-
bility of 0.01 or less makes a prima facie case of
jury discrimination. In the hypothetical example,
if thirty-eight or fewer blacks appear on the jury
roll, a prima fade case has been made,- and the
burden shifts to the state to explain the discrep-
ancy. If the selection procedure is, in fact, un-
biased, there is a 1 per cent chance that it will pro-
duce a jury roll which makes a prima facie case
against it. The court faces a 1 per cent risk of
falsely concluding that the selection procedure is
biased. On the other hand, a biased selection pro-
cedure could be used so long as the names of more
than thirty-eight blacks appear on the roll. If, for
example, as names are drawn for the jury roll, every
fifth black name is discarded, then blacks have
only four chances out of nine of being on the jury
roll. The procedure is clearly discriminatory; yet,
there is about an 88 per cent chance that more than
thirty-eight black names will appear on the roll,
and the discrimination will go undetected. If the
discrimination persisted over several jury rolls,
however, it would almost certainly be detected. In
drawing the line, the court is deciding two things.
It is deciding how much discrimination it will tol-
erate, and it is deciding the risk a fair selection
procedure runs of being falsely condemned. Draw-
ing the line in advance quantifies the meaning of
"beyond a reasonable doubt."
If the line is drawn, it should be drawn in terms
of a probability rather than in terms of some per-
centage point discrepancy. I have suggested that
most people would not suspect foul play in a 45-55
split on a jury roll of 100 names drawn from a com-
munity consisting of 50 per cent blacks. This is a
five percentage point discrepancy. If the method of
selection is unbiased, then on a jury roll of 100
names, the probability of a discrepancy of five or
1974]
JOHN S. DE CANI
more percentage points in favor of whites is about
0.18. On a jury roll of 10,000 names, however, the
probability of such a discrepancy is less than one
in a billion billion, i.e., a decimal point followed by
18 zeroes and a one. This is about the same as the
probability of tossing 60 or more consecutive heads
with a fair coin.
The probabilities I have encountered in jury dis-
crimination cases have been astonishingly small.
In most of our work, statisticians deal with proba-
bilities of the order of 0.01 or 0.001. A probability
of 0.0001 is unusual. Yet, in Swain, the first case
in which I prepared testimony, I obtained a prob-
ability which, if written out in full, would be writ-
ten as a decimal point followed by 195 zeroes and
a 4. How does one comprehend such a probability?
The only way, it seems to me, is by comparison
with other rare events with which the court is fami-
liar. In five card draw poker-with no wild cards-
the probability of a royal flush is one chance in
649,750. In decimal form this is written as
0.000001539. The probability of two or more con-
secutive royal flushes is the square of this number,
or about 0.000000000002. If we could deal one
poker hand a second, we would have to wait, on
the average, more than 13,000 years before we saw
two or more royal flushes back-to-back. Two or
more consecutive royal flushes is an extremely rare
event. The probability I obtained in Swain is less
than the probability of 30 or more consecutive
royal flushes. The smallest such probability I have
obtained occurred in Salary. It was less than the
chances of being dealt 500 or more consecutive
royal flushes, a real statistical treasure.
While the court didn't hear my analogy in
Swain, I've had fun with it elsewhere. In one case,
the judge in a recess asked about the probability
of filling an inside straight, and, in another, the
judge declared that he would "start shooting" on
the third consecutive royal flush. (He then asked
that his remark be struck from the record.)
Other kinds of statistical arguments have been
suggested in order to buttress the claim of jury
discrimination. Finkelstein refers to State v. Barks-
dale,18 in which on nine consecutive grand juries,
eight contained two blacks and one contained one
black. This uniformity is striking and could be
evidence of a policy of limiting the number of
blacks on any grand jury to two. The probability
of this happening by chance is 0.0014. In one case,
I was asked to compute the probability that on a
venire of 50 persons drawn at random from the
jury roll, the first 21 names on the list-in order of
their being drawn-would be those of white per-
sons when the jury roll contained 80 per cent white
names. This probability is about 0.0018. Both of
these events are unlikely, but it is up to the court
to decide whether an event having a probability of
slightly less than one in five hundred is rare enough
to justify the conclusion that it could not have oc-
curred by chance. Such arguments are peripheral
to the main argument, however. The result of the
selection process must be discriminatory. Other-
wise, the plaintiff cannot make a prima face case.
I am not optimistic or naive enough to believe
that statistics will save the world from jury dis-
crimination. As statistical arguments become ac-
cepted in the courts, discrimination will become less
blatant. Probabilities like the ones in Swain or
Salary will not occur. Discrimination will become
more subtle. If courts are willing to draw the line at
probabilities of. 0.01 or 0.001, the limits of dis-
crimination will be defined. If discriminatory prac-
tices persist, statistics will eventually flush them
out.
18247 La. 198, 170 So. 2d 374 (1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 921 (1965).
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